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An Examination of the Relation between State Fiscal Health and Amnesty Enactment 
1.  Introduction 
All state governments in the United States rely on various taxes as a major source of their 
general fund revenues. Ensuring that citizens comply with their tax codes requires states to spend 
funds to deter noncompliance, detect its magnitude, and prosecute tax evaders. However, from 
an economic point of view, these government expenditures are inefficient in that they represent a 
real resource cost, while any additional revenues generated are simply a transfer of resources 
from the private to the public sector (Alm 2005). Therefore, states may at times decide to offer 
tax  amnesties  to  their  citizens.  Tax  amnesties  are  government  programs  that  usually  grant 
immunity from legal prosecution and reduced financial penalties to tax evaders who voluntarily 
pay outstanding tax liabilities and interest, typically within a short period of time.  
Tax  amnesties  are  sometimes  seen  as  a  “costless  tax,”  because  participation  in  an 
amnesty is voluntary. When a state offers an amnesty, evaders who wish to rejoin the tax system, 
can  do  so  without  facing  fines  and  possible  public  embarrassment  they  might  face  if  their 
evasion gets revealed without the amnesty. This represents a ceteris paribus Pareto improvement 
because  these  individuals  gain,  and  revenue  increases,  while  no  one  else  loses.  States  raise 
additional tax revenues, which they can use to provide more public goods or to payoff public 
debt than they would have, without the tax amnesty. States can also use the additional revenues 
that amnesties generate to alleviate their fiscal stress. 
However,  amnesties  are  clearly  not  universal.  Some  question  the  abilities  of  tax 
amnesties to produce additional revenues. Experiences also indicate that amnesty revenues are 
overstated  or  exaggerated  that  would  (or  could)  have  been  raised  by  normal  enforcement 
procedures.  Although  amnesty  revenues  may  help  alleviate  fiscal  stress,  critics  see  them  as   2
inconsistent  with  the  principles  of  “good”  governance.  Tax  amnesties  provide  incentives  for 
otherwise honest taxpayers to start evading taxes in anticipation of future amnesty offerings, 
thereby weakening tax compliance and fostering a perception of inefficiency in the tax system. 
Thus, amnesties may not be truly “costless” without any economic and/or fiscal repercussion for 
the states. 
Although the federal tax code has allowed some variation of permanent tax amnesty since 
1919 (Andreoni 1991), state tax amnesties are of fairly recent origin. Arizona introduced its first 
tax  amnesty  in  1982.
1 Since  then,  41  states  and  the  District  of  Columbia  have  enacted  tax 
amnesties in three waves: the early to mid- 1980s, the late-1990s, and during the first half of this 
decade. Table 1 presents the frequency with which states have offered tax amnesties between 
1982 and 2005.  Using the same period, Figure 1 illustrates the number of amnesties offered each 
year. Notice that the frequency of tax amnesties rose during and after the 2001 recession. In fact, 
between  2001  and  2005  alone,  states  offered  twenty-eight  amnesties  with  24  repeated  for  a 
second, third, or even fourth time. These broad-based amnesties include all major state taxes but 
some exclude property tax, motor fuel tax, or other taxes.  
[Table 1, about here] 
[Figure 1, about here] 
While tax amnesty literature is vast, analysis of the factors behind amnesty adoptions is 
quite limited.
2 In fact, except Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1992) who analyze the first wave of 
amnesties  during  the  1980s,  none  have  explored  why  states  enact  or  repeat  an  amnesty. 
                                                 
1 Federation of Tax Administrators (FTA), http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/amnesty1.html. 
 
2 For taxpayer response to amnesties, see Joulfaian (1988), Fisher, Goddeeris, and Young (1989), Alm and Beck 
(1991), Malik and Schwab (1991), and Christian, Gupta and Young (2002). For revenue effect of an amnesty, see 
Alm and Beck (1990, 1993), Andreoni (1991), Luitel (2007), and Luitel and Sobel (2007). 
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Assuming a normal distribution of hazards, Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (DGW hereafter) conclude 
that states are likely to run amnesties in response to revenue yield motive. However, given the 
increased frequency with which states enacted amnesties during and after the 2001 recession, we 
investigate if there is a possible shift from the revenue yield motive to the fiscal stress motive or 
if the normal distribution of hazards assumption plays a role in this paradox such that the fiscal 
stress motive is and has always been the primary factor underlying these amnesties. Analysis of 
state tax amnesties is important for it provides insight into the behavior of a fiscally constrained 
state government that faces a trade-off between immediate benefits and future hidden losses.  
We apply several methods of event history analysis to examine the initial (first) and the 
repeated tax amnesties separately, using a panel of annual data from all 50 states for the period 
1982-2005.  We  include  various  measures  of  state  fiscal  health,  as  well  as  political  and 
demographic control variables. We find that the assumption regarding the distribution of hazards 
plays a critical role in distinguishing between the revenue yield and the fiscal stress hypotheses; 
particularly,  the  normal  distribution  of  hazards  assumption  along  with  the  multicollinearity 
problem led prior research to an erroneous conclusion. As such, our results contrast sharply with 
prior research. We find that the fiscal stress motive, not the revenue yield motive, is indeed the 
most significant contributing factor that led the states to enact amnesties. Our results are robust 
to a separate analysis of the initial and the repeated tax amnesties that states enacted between 
1982 and 2005.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a brief summary of U.S. state tax 
amnesty experience, as well as our research hypotheses. Section 3 and Section 4 discuss our 
study’s data and estimation methods. Section 5 reports our results and Section 6 concludes. 
     4
2.  U.S. State Tax Amnesty Experience 
Like many countries, tax amnesties have become increasingly popular among the U.S. 
states  in  recent  years.
3 Table  2,  which  summarizes  the  main  features  of  state  tax  amnesties, 
reveals  that  a  majority  of  state  amnesties  (66  out  of  79)  were  approved  through  legislative 
authorization. Similarly, forty-two amnesties allowed delinquent tax payers identified by the tax 
authorities (accounts receivable) to participate in the program. While twenty-eight amnesties 
permitted  taxes  to  be  paid  in  installments,  thirty-one  amnesties  did  not  provide  such 
arrangements.  
[Table 2, about here] 
Accordingly, Table 3 shows a detailed listing of the state tax amnesties between 1982 and 
2005. Tax amnesty length varies widely among states.
 During the 1982 – 2005 period, Kentucky 
conducted the shortest amnesty lasting 15 days in 1988, while Oklahoma in 1983 and Arkansas 
in  1984  offered  the  longest  amnesty  lasting  183  days.  Similarly,  the  table  also  presents  the 
official tax collection data in 2005 constant dollars reported by each state and reveals a large 
variation  in  short-term  revenue  yield  among  states.  While  nineteen  state  tax  amnesties  were 
reported  to  bring  in  short-run  revenues  greater  than  or  equal  to  $100  million,  five  states 
generated $1 million or less. On the one hand, such sharp differences in revenue yields may 
reflect differences in the population and economic size of these states; on the other, though not 
unimportant,  these  amnesty  collections  are  small  relative  to  state  total  tax  collections.  For 
example, Table 3 also reveals that between 1982 and 2005 amnesties generated an average of 
only 0.75 percent, and never account for more than three percent of state total tax collections. 
More importantly, however, as Luitel (2007) and Luitel and Sobel (2007) show, these short-run 
                                                 
3 An alternative to a formal state tax amnesty program is a voluntary disclosure agreement (VDA) which allows 
taxpayers to file taxes owed from previous years within a binding agreement.   5
revenue gains come only at the expense of long-run future losses accompanying the amnesty. 
Thus,  our  objective  in  this  paper  is  to  examine  what  motivates  states  to  tap  these  short-run 
revenue gains on a repeated basis, highlighting the direction of the state government finances in 
recent years. 
[Table 3, about here] 
DGW examine the two hypotheses for amnesty adoption by states: revenue yield and 
fiscal stress. The revenue yield hypothesis suggests that states with high income are more likely 
to adopt an amnesty because amnesties in such states should generate more revenues. Alternately, 
the fiscal stress hypothesis argues that states in need of revenues are more likely to adopt an 
amnesty. For example, when incomes fall during recessions, especially when raising revenues 
from  conventional  sources  of  taxation  becomes  increasingly  difficult,  states  may  be  more 
inclined to introduce new revenue sources. Based on the analysis of a normal distribution of 
hazards assumption, DGW support the revenue yield hypothesis for initial amnesties enacted 
during the 1980s. As noted in Section 1, the frequency of repeated amnesties rose in the first half 
of this decade during and after the 2001 recession (see figure 1). Since most states have balanced 
budget requirements (GAO 1993), the 2001 recession resulted in many states developing new 
methods of increasing revenues (NASBO 2004). We explore if fiscal pressure plays any role in 
the introduction of tax amnesties, with emphasis on repeated amnesties, which have remained 
largely uninvestigated. 
3.  Factors in Amnesty Enactment 
DGW use the normal distribution of hazards assumption to test the revenue yield vs. the 
fiscal  stress  hypotheses.  In  order  to  provide  evidence  that  use  of  the  normal  distribution  of 
hazards assumption is  wrong, we use the key  variables that DGW use in their analysis: (1)   6
personal income; (2) tax revenue; and (3) the unemployment rate. However, there are similarities 
and differences between our use of these variables and DGW’s. We discuss them below. 
  First, like DGW, we use per capita personal income as a measure of a state’s fiscal health. 
The  revenue  yield  hypothesis  implies  a  positive  relation  between  personal  income  and  the 
probability of a state tax amnesty, while the fiscal stress hypothesis suggests a negative relation. 
Given our argument that the increased number of amnesties enacted during and after the 2001 
recession reflect the fiscal stress hypothesis, we predict a negative relation between these two 
variables. DGW predict a positive relation between these two variables. 
  Unlike  DGW  who  use  state  income  tax,  we  use  state  total  tax  revenue  as  a  second 
measure of fiscal health.
4 Using income tax as a measure of fiscal health ignores states without 
income taxes. Because nontrivial numbers of states with or without income taxes have enacted 
amnesties (see Table 1), we argue that when the total tax revenues decline, especially during 
recessions, states are more determined to close existing loopholes in their tax systems and to 
expand their tax bases. Consequently, states would be more likely to enact amnesties during 
periods of fiscal crises when state tax revenues fall. We again predict a negative relation between 
per capita total tax revenue and the probability that a state introduces an amnesty, consistent with 
the fiscal stress hypothesis. DGW predict a positive relation between taxes and state amnesty 
enactments. (For a discussion of causality between taxes and amnesty, see Normal distribution of 
hazards under section 4.1 Parametric Approach.) 
  Our final measure of a state’s fiscal health indicator is the unemployment rate. During a 
recession,  the  unemployment  rate  rises  as  production  falls,  possibly  increasing  the 
noncompliance problem as well. If the revenue yield hypothesis holds, then states might not 
enact an amnesty when the unemployment rate is high since the amnesty would produce less 
                                                 
4 In fact, DGW use the percentage change specification of state income tax.   7
revenue. DGW also acknowledge this fact by noting that “states with higher unemployment rates 
may have unsound economies, and thus an amnesty in such a state would produce less revenue” 
(pp.  1063).  However,  because  states  with  fiscal  stress  are  particularly  prone  to  finding  new 
revenue sources (NASBO 2004), we predict a positive relation between the unemployment rate 
and  the  probability  of  a  tax  amnesty  enactment.  DGW  also  predict  a  positive  relationship 
between the unemployment rate and state tax amnesty enactment but for an entirely different 
reason. Instead of relating unemployment rate to fiscal stress, they relate it to revenue yield by 
arguing that the presence of per capita income in their model mitigates the effect of unsound 
economies and that states with high unemployment rates would have greater potential revenue 
yield from both higher number of non-filers and a larger underground economy. 
As we noted in section 2, a majority of state amnesties (66 out of 79) were approved 
through legislative authorization. We, therefore, include several state related political variables. 
At the policy formulation level, an amnesty bill should face less political opposition if the same 
political party controls both the executive (the governor) and the legislative branches (the house 
and/or the senate) of government. Hence, a state may be more likely to enact an amnesty if its 
governor  and  its  legislative  branches  are  controlled  by  a  single  party.  We  use  two  separate 
dummy variables, Democrat and Republican, to examine whether a state is more likely to enact 
an amnesty if its governor and its legislative branches are controlled by either the Democrats or 
Republicans. Since these two political parties typically hold opposing views regarding taxes and 
other social issues, using two dummy variables allows us to also examine which political party is 
more likely to support or oppose an amnesty bill. If the Democrats control both branches of 
government  (i.e.  the  Governor  and  the  Legislature),  Democrat  takes  the  value  of  1  and  0   8
otherwise. Similarly, if the Republicans control the government, Republican takes the value of 1 
and 0 otherwise.
5  
Another political variable is the election year dummy, which takes the value of 1 if a 
gubernatorial election is held in a particular  year and 0 otherwise. Torgler, Schaltegger, and 
Schaffner (2003) and Torgler and Schaltegger (2005) find that tax compliance rises if a possible 
tax  amnesty  is  subjected  to  a  popular  vote,  regardless  of  whether  the  amnesty  is  passed  or 
rejected. If elected officials face less opposition enacting amnesties introduced during an election 
year,  an  election  year  dummy  will  have  a  positive  effect  on  the  probability  of  tax  amnesty 
enactment. However, if amnesties are seen as a departure from “good governance,” candidates 
may  not  wish  to  introduce  them  during  an  election  year,  which  implies  a  negative  relation 
between election year dummy and amnesty. Thus, the predicted relationship between election 
year dummy and the probability of amnesty is ambiguous. 
Additionally,  we  use  state  population  over  the  age  of  65  as  a  demographic  control 
variable. The elderly population is generally politically active and tends to oppose tax increases 
or certain expenditures backed by taxes such as the property tax. Therefore, this age group may 
support tax amnesties that could be seen as substitutes for tax increases. The higher the share of 
this population group, the more likely a state will be to introduce an amnesty. 
In some specification, we use the personal income tax rate, the corporate income tax rate, 
and the sales tax rate to control for state tax system changes. The potential relationship between 
tax rates and amnesty enactments depends on three possibilities: (i) increasing tax rates removes 
states from the risk of enacting an amnesty; (ii) increasing tax rates raises or lowers (but not to 
zero) the risk of enacting an amnesty; and (iii) increasing tax rates does not affect the risk of 
                                                 
5 Note that almost all states have split control in one year or the other in our study period. Therefore, Democrat and 
Republican do not sum to one and including both of these variables in a regression model does not necessarily lead 
to a dummy variable trap.   9
enacting an amnesty. Thus, a priori, we cannot predict the relation between the tax rates and the 
probability of an amnesty enactment. 
We obtain a panel of annual data for all 50 United States for the period from 1982 (the 
year Arizona enacted its first amnesty) to 2005 (the most recent available year).
6 We use the 
natural  logarithmic  form  for  all  variables  except  the  dummy  variables.  Table  4  provides  a 
detailed description of our variables, summary statistics and data sources. Table 5 presents a 
correlation matrix for our regression variables, which reports that the fiscal health indicators are 
highly correlated. 
4.  Estimation Methods 
We apply various methods of event history to model the effects of these variables on the 
amnesty adoption decision by states. Amnesty is a dichotomous variable, which takes the value 
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We  define  the  risk  set  as  those  states  that  have  not  yet  enacted  an  amnesty  and  are 
therefore at risk of introducing one at each point in time. We also define the hazard (transition) 
rate,  h(t),  as  the  probability  that  an  event  --  amnesty  --  will  occur  at  a  particular  time  in  a 
particular state, given that the state is at risk at that time. More formally, the hazard rate for 






t h =   (2) 
                                                 
6 According to DGW, Illinois had its first amnesty from 12/28/1981 to 01/08/1982 but it is not reported in the FTA 
list. The 1981 Illinois amnesty started four days prior to the end of the year and extended until the first week of 
1982, therefore, 1982 would still be a reasonable starting point.  
   10 
where f(t) is the probability of amnesty adoption by states during the interval from t to t + ∆ t and 
S(t)  is  the  survival  function  or  the  probability  of  not  having  adopted  an  amnesty  prior  to  t. 
Although the hazard rate is unobserved, it controls both the occurrence and the timing of an 
amnesty; thus, it is the fundamental dependent variable. We model this hazard rate as a function 
of time and other covariates. 
We allow both the revenue yield and the fiscal stress motives to co-exist as the hazard 
function is likely to change along with a state’s economic condition. For example, if the fiscal 
stress hypothesis holds, then the hazard function may increase during recessions and decrease 
during economic expansions. In contrast, if the revenue yield hypothesis holds, the function may 
decrease during recessions and increase during economic expansions. An intermediate case is 
also possible where some states enact amnesties in response to fiscal pressure concerns, while 
others enact them in response to revenue yield concerns. Co-existence of both motives requires a 
separate analysis for each amnesty. Thus, we model a state’s first (initial) amnesty separately and 
all amnesties combined (including repeated amnesties).
7 
4.1  Parametric Approach 
We  use  various  parametric  approaches  of  event  history  analysis  to  model  the  hazard 
function based on the following assumptions while investigating the validity of each assumption: 
(i) normal distribution of hazards; (ii) constant distribution of hazards; and, (iii) increasing or 
decreasing distribution of hazards. 
Normal distribution of hazards: Is a normal distribution of hazards a reasonable assumption to 
analyze the increased frequency of amnesties enacted during and after 2001 recession? Or, is it 
                                                 
7 For the analysis of the first amnesty, once a state introduces an amnesty, it is no longer at risk and we drop its 
subsequent observations from the data set; however, for the analysis of repeated amnesties, all states are at risk at 
each point in time; therefore, we drop no observation from the data set.  
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valid only for amnesties in the 1980s? We investigate these questions using data for the period 
1982-2005 and for the period 1980-1988 for which we replicate the DGW results.
8  
To estimate the parameters, DGW use a two-stage instrumental variable (2SIV) technique 
making an argument that the duration model is potentially endogenous to the IRS audit rate. We 
do  not  have  IRS  audit  rate  data.
9 Surprisingly,  DGW  do  not  discuss  the  multicollinearity 
problem,  which  we  discover  as  reported  in  Table  5.  Nevertheless,  the  potential  endogeneity 
(causality) between taxes and amnesty needs a special attention, which we address next.  
In  general  equilibrium  framework,  all  economic  variables  affect  all  other  variables, 
implying that all variables are endogenous (causal). We do not take this route; rather, we utilize 
the properties of temporal aggregation in this research. Note that the data generating processes 
for two different series (personal income tax vs. total tax) are different; even for a single series, 
time  series  properties  of  monthly,  quarterly,  and  annual  series  can  have  very  different 
characteristics  due  to  temporal  aggregation  (Rossana  and  Seater,  1995,  Marcellino,  1999). 
Specifically,  the  causality  property  is  not  invariant  to  temporal  aggregation  (Granger,  1990, 
Marcellino, 1999). When we examine the bidirectional causality between taxes and amnesty 
using bivariate empirical causality models, we indeed find that taxes and amnesty are weakly 
exogenous. Simply put, using bivariate models, in no case do we find bidirectional causality 
between current period taxes and amnesty.
10 It is important to note that the economic agents who 
announce an amnesty and who participate in the amnesty program are different. Moreover, since 
                                                 
8 We count the 1981 Illinois amnesty as an event and include it in the analysis only when we replicate the DGW 
results for the sample period 1980-1988. 
 
9 We contacted the research division of the IRS to obtain the audit rate data but did not receive any response to our 
inquiry. 
 
10 We also checked if taxes and amnesty are correlated. We find that the correlation coefficient between taxes and 
amnesty is 0.017, which is not significantly different from zero.  
   12 
a  majority  of  state  amnesty  programs  are  approved  by  legislative  authorization  as  noted  in 
section  2,  there  is  generally  a  significant  lag  in  the  announcement  and  participation  in  the 
amnesty program. Thus, we are convinced that these two facts may play a role in the temporal 
aggregation. We will point out temporal aggregation’s implication in the concluding section. 
Note  that  when  two  variables  are  weakly  exogenous,  statistical  testing  is  permitted 
(Gujarati, 2003, Kennedy, 2003). Thus, we proceed to test for the normal distribution of hazards 
assumption using the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) method, appropriate for both small 
and large samples. As an estimation method for censored data, MLE combines the censored and 
uncensored  observations  and  produces  estimates  that  are  asymptotically  unbiased,  normally 
distributed, and efficient (Allison, 1984).  
Untabulated results reveal that the coefficient estimates of the variables of interest using 
MLE are insignificant either individually or jointly for the full sample period.
11 Therefore, the 
normal distribution of hazard is not a valid assumption to analyze amnesty adoption by states for 
the full sample period. Evidently, this will be clear as we discuss DGW’s results below.  
[Table 6, about here] 
Table 6, column 1 shows the regression results from MLE following DGW’s methods. 
Specifically,  we  use  percentage  change  in  total  tax  revenue  and  include  the  1981  Illinois 
amnesty,  while  we  exclude  Alaska,  Connecticut,  Florida,  Nevada,  New  Hampshire,  South 
Dakota,  Tennessee,  Texas,  Washington,  and  Wyoming.  We  find  that  per  capita  income  and 
unemployment rate are positive and significant at the five percent level, while the percentage 
change in total tax revenue is positive but insignificant. DGW find that taxes and unemployment 
rate are positive and significant, while per capita income is positive but insignificant. These 
                                                 
11 These results as well as all results not reported in the ensuing discussion are available from the authors upon 
request. 
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differences are due to multicollinearity problem in the data. Apart from these differences, the 
results presented above qualitatively parallel DGW’s results reported in Model 2 of Table IV in 
their paper (pp. 1068), which they use to interpret their results. Undoubtedly, these results are 
sensitive to the states included in the sample. Column 2 of Table 6, which reports results from 
the regression model including all 50 states, reveals that all variables remain positive but they are 
not individually or jointly significant. Thus, we conclude that the normal distribution of hazards 
is  an  invalid  assumption  to  analyze  the  amnesty  adoption  process  by  states  for  any  sample 
period. 
Constant distribution of hazards: If we assume constant distribution of hazards, then amnesties 
(events) occur randomly independent of time. This assumption implies that states were equally 
likely  to  enact  an  amnesty  in  1982  as  they  were  in  2002.  Since  survival  times  follow  an 
exponential distribution in this assumption, we use an exponential regression model as a first 
approximation  for  comparison  purposes.  This  model  is  attractive  from  a  mathematical  and 
computational point of view and takes the following form: 
( )
( ) k kx e t h
β α+ =   (3) 
or, 
( ) k kx t h β α + = ln   (4) 
In order to determine the exponential model’s goodness of fit, we conduct an analysis of 
pseudo residuals or generalized residuals as suggested by Cox and Snell (1968). If the model fits 
the  data,  these  residuals  will  follow  a  standard  exponential  distribution.  We  obtain  the 
generalized  Cox-Snell  residuals  from  each  model,  calculate  an  empirical  estimate  of  the 
cumulative hazard function, and plot it against the Cox-Snell residuals. We find that the model is 
a poor fit for both the first amnesty and repeated amnesties suggesting that the assumption of   14 
constant hazards is incorrect. Since many amnesties cluster around different points in time, we 
find no support for the assumption of constant distribution of hazards.  
Increasing or decreasing distribution of hazards. If we assume that the hazards change (i.e. 
increase  or  decrease)  with  time,  then  using  the  Gompertz  model  or  the  Weibull  model  is 
appropriate. These two models differ slightly in the way time enters into them. The Gompertz 
model allows the log of hazards to change linearly with time and takes the following form: 
( ) ct x t h k k + + = β α ln ,  (5) 
where c is a constant which may be either positive or negative (Allison, 1984). The Weibull 
model  assumes  that  the  log  of  hazards  changes  linearly  with  the  log  of  time  and  takes  the 
following form: 
( ) t c x t h k k ln ln + + = β α ,  (6) 
where c is constrained to be greater than -1 (Allison, 1984). In these two models, the transition 
rate either increases or decreases monotonically with time until an amnesty takes place, but the 
rate does not change direction. 
  We repeat the analysis of pseudo residuals to assess the goodness of fit of both models. 
As  in  the  exponential  model,  we  obtain  the  generalized  Cox-Snell  residuals,  calculate  an 
empirical estimate of the cumulative hazard function, and then plot the cumulative hazard against 
the Cox-Snell residuals. We find that these models also do not fit the data very well, either for 
the first amnesty or repeated amnesties. 
While the hazard is constant in the exponential model, it may increase or decrease with 
time, but may not change direction in both the Gompertz and the Weibull models. Thus, a major 
shortcoming of all three models is that the researcher must assume a constant, increasing, or 
decreasing relation between the hazard rate and time, and we have little information on which to   15 
base such a choice. More importantly, if the hazard function is truly non-monotonic due to co-
existence of revenue yield or fiscal stress motives, then none of the above models is appropriate. 
These shortcomings are overcome in the Cox regression model, which we describe next. 
4.2  Semi-parametric Approach  
We use Cox’s regression model since it does not require any assumption of the relation between 
time and the hazard rate. The Cox model is the most general form of the regression models, and 
takes the following form:  
( ) ( ) k k x e t h x t h
*
0 * ) , (
β = ,  (7) 
where h(t, x) denotes the hazard rate, given the values of the k covariates and the survival time 
(t). The term h0(t) denotes the baseline hazard, that is, the hazard for the each state when the 
values of all covariates are equal to zero.  Note that in this model, the hazard rate is a product of 
two terms, first being the baseline hazard rate, h0(t), and a second term specifying the possible 
influences of the covariates on the transition rate. If we divide both sides of equation (7) by h0(t) 
and then take the natural logarithm of both sides, the model is then transformed into a linear 
form:  
{ } [ ] k k x t h x t h * ) ( / ) , ( ln 0 β =               (8) 
Because  this  function  does  not  have  to  be  specified,  the  Cox  model  is  also  called  partially 
parametric  or  semi-parametric,  and  is  often  referred  to  as  the  “proportional  hazards  model.” 
Above all, the Cox model is so general and nonrestrictive that it is often considered a satisfactory 
approximation, even when the proportional hazards assumption is violated (Allison, 1984).  
Because  our  fiscal  health  indicators  are  highly  correlated  as  reported  in  Table  5,  we 
perform a principle components analysis (PCA) due to concerns about multicollinearity. PCA 
uses a linear combination of these highly correlated variables and creates a composite index that   16 
captures as much of the variation in these variables as possible. The main shortcoming of this 
approach  is  that  the  composite  index  is  difficult  to  justify  because  it  combines  correlated 
variables,  measured  in  different  units,  which  move  in  the  opposite  direction.  For  example, 
income and tax revenues, measured in dollars, are negatively associated with the amnesty, while 
unemployment rate, measured in percentage point, is positively associated with the amnesty. 
Even so, when we perform this analysis, we find that the main principle component explains 
more than 65 percent of the variation in these variables. Technically, we find that among the 
three fiscal health indicators, only one principle component has an eigenvalue greater than one. 
Therefore, we include only one fiscal health indicator in each regression model, but report results 
for all fiscal health indicators. 
5.  Empirical Results 
We report the results in two sets of regression tables. Table 7A, Table 7B, and Table 7C 
present results for the adoption of the initial tax amnesties, while Table 8A, Table 8B, and Table 
8C present results for the repeated tax amnesties, where each table differs by the main fiscal 
health  indicator  included  in  the  regression.  In  each  table,  Model  (1)  shows  results  for  the 
regressions using all 50 states, while Model (2) shows results only for those states with income 
and sales taxes. In each model, column (1) shows the size of the coefficients, column (2) shows 
the hazard ratio, and column (3) shows the z-statistics. Notice the relation between column (1) 
and column (2). The coefficients in column (1) can be obtained by taking the logarithm of the 
respective coefficients in column (2). Alternatively, the coefficients in column (2) can also be 
obtained by exponentiating the respective coefficients in column (1). For dichotomous variables, 
it is common to just report the hazard ratio (column 2). The numbers in column (2) indicate how 
the hazard ratio would change if the appropriate variable were to change in size by one unit.   17 
According to Teachman and Hayward (1993), the exact interpretation for a dichotomous dummy 
variable  is  100[exp(βk*1)  –  exp(βk*0)]/exp(βk*0),  while  for  a  continuous  variable  is 
100{exp[βk*(x  +  1)]  –  exp(βk*x)}/exp(βk*x).  Therefore,  a  hazard  ratio  greater  (less)  than  1 
indicates that an increase (decrease) in the explanatory variable increases the probability of an 
amnesty occurring. However, when the explanatory variables are used in the logarithmic form, 
the interpretation of the hazard ratio becomes difficult. This difficulty is overcome by taking the 
logarithm of the hazard ratio -- the coefficient so obtained is then converted into a measure of 
elasticity. Since we use dummy variables as well as variables in the logarithmic form, we report 
both the hazard ratio and β coefficients. 
To give an example of what the numbers in the tables mean, using Model (1) column (1) 
results in Table 8A, a one percent increase in per capita income lowers the hazard rate by 4.189 
percent.  This  effect  may  be  easier  to  understand  in  relation  to  average  per  capita  personal 
income. In our sample, average per capita real personal income is $27,353 in 2005 constant 
dollars. Our results imply that a one percent increase in average per capita personal income (from 
$27,353 to $27,626) lowers the hazard rate by 4.189 percent. Similarly, using Model (1) column 
(1) results in Table 8C, if a state experiences a one percent increase in unemployment rate, that 
state’s hazard rate increases by approximately 2.089 percent relative to a state without a change 
in unemployment rate. Other coefficients have a similar interpretation. 
[Table 7A, 7B, 7C, 8A, 8B, and 8C about here] 
Consider the fiscal health indicators. The results reveal that, as expected, fiscal health 
indicators  are  consistently  significant  in  the  expected  direction.  In  each  of  the  regressions 
reported in the tables, the coefficients on each of the fiscal health indicators are negative, except 
in the regressions using the unemployment rate where the coefficient is positive. This indicates   18 
that a state’s fiscal health (stress) is a significant negative (positive) contributing factor to tax 
amnesty adoption. Particularly, decreases in per capita personal income, or per capita total tax 
revenue,  are  associated  with  a  greater  likelihood  of  tax  amnesty  adoption.    In  the  case  of 
unemployment, an increase in state unemployment rate is associated with a greater likelihood of 
tax amnesty adoption. These results are generally similar between the initial and the repeated 
amnesties.  
Except fiscal health indicators, our results do not provide any strong evidence about the 
effects of political, demographic, and tax rates control variables on amnesty enactment as these 
variables are not statistically significant in all models. This fact explains why states heavily 
discount  future  hidden  losses  in  favor  of  the  short-run  revenue  gains  from  the  amnesty. 
Nonetheless, below we discuss the outstanding pattern of results of other variables. 
With  regard  to  political  factors,  the  coefficient  on  the  variable  Republican  is  always 
negative.  This  might  indicate  that  Republican  control  of  state  government  decreases  the 
probability of amnesty adoption, which is consistent with Republicans, typically conservatives, 
opposing liberal initiatives. The coefficient on Election is not significant in any of the models, 
consistent  with  the  opposing  arguments  about  the  relation  between  an  election  and  amnesty 
enactment. Interestingly, the coefficient on Election switches sign from negative in the initial 
amnesties to positive in the repeated amnesties.  
The demographic control variable, population 65 years and older typically has a positive 
coefficient, except when unemployment rate is the main fiscal health indicator in the subset of 
data that includes tax rate variables in Table 8C. When the estimate is positive, it is statistically 
significant in some of the regressions. This might be an indication that elderly, who are often a   19 
politically active group, support initiatives like tax amnesties that raise state revenues without 
new taxes or increased rates for current taxes. 
Finally, we report the results including the tax rate variables in Model (2) of each table. 
Including or excluding the tax rate variables has virtually no qualitative impact on the estimated 
fiscal health indicators. The coefficient on the personal income tax rate is always positive, but it 
is not significant when the unemployment rate is the main fiscal health indicator. In contrast, the 
coefficient on the sales tax rate is always negative, and it is significant when the unemployment 
rate is the main fiscal health indicator. Though positive, the coefficient on the corporate income 
tax rate is not significant in any of the models. While it may be possible that in higher rate states, 
as  opposed  to  increasing  the  rate,  the  positive  coefficients  on  personal  income  tax  rate  and 
corporate income tax rate would be consistent with the states having more potential revenue from 
an amnesty enactment, and thus supporting the revenue yield hypothesis. Historically, however, 
states increase tax rates in recession. For example, in the 1991-92 and 2001 recessions, 44 and 30 
states respectively raised their tax rates (Johnson, Nicholas and Pennington, 2009). Given the 
conflicting patterns of results between the income tax rate and the sales tax rate, we cannot 
predict a clear relation between tax rates and amnesty. This requires an elaborate analysis of 
multiple events, which we intend to pursue in future research. 
5.1  Extensions and Robustness Checks  
We consider a number of issues to examine the robustness and sensitivity of our results. 
First,  we  used  alternative  measures  of  fiscal  health  since  multicollinearity  prevents  us  from 
including all fiscal health indicators in each model. We find that our main finding does not 
change even when we use gross state product (GSP) or federal government transfers to state 
government. We also tried outstanding debt as another possible fiscal health indicator but we did   20 
not find this variable a consistently significant determinant of amnesty adoption. We are not 
surprised to see this result, however, for three reasons: First the link between debt and amnesty 
adoption could be rather complex since many states accumulate debt to finance capital projects 
during times of fiscal health. This means the relationship between debt and fiscal stress is not 
necessarily  positive.  Second,  state  balanced  budget  requirements  impose  restrictions  on  state 
borrowing which could lead to significant discrepancy between state borrowing and debt and 
state fiscal stress.
12 Finally, other studies in related literatures such as state lottery adoption also 
did not find a significant relationship between long term debt and lottery adoption by states 
(Alm, McKee and Skidmore, 1993).
13  
Next, we tested if neighborhood effect explains the amnesty adoption decision by states. 
For  this,  we  use  various  measures  including  a  simple  dummy  variable  indicating  whether  a 
neighboring state has an amnesty, the actual number of neighboring states adopting an amnesty, 
and the total number of states offering an amnesty. We find no evidence that the neighborhood 
effect relates to amnesty adoption decision by states. While we already consider several sources 
of  heterogeneity  across  states  in  our  regressions,  we  also  investigate  if  other  potentially 
important  factors  or  state  characteristics  could  change  our  results.  These  could  be  state  tax 
characteristics other than tax rates, voting rules or state physical characteristics such as climate, 
land area, topography, etc. For this we run regressions with state fixed effects. Our main finding 
on the fiscal stress hypothesis was robust to the inclusion of state fixed effects in our regression 
models. 
                                                 
12 Using a fiscal deficit variable is similarly problematic since many states impose strict anti-deficit rules within their 
balanced budget requirements. See Poterba (1995) for a good overview of state balanced budget requirements. 
 
13 Alm, McKee, and Skidmore (1993) find a significant relation between a state’s short-term debt and state lotteries, 
but they do not find such a clear relation between a state’s long-term debt and state lotteries. In our case, we were 
not able to obtain a breakdown of short-term and long-term debt for our complete data set. 
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6.  Summary and Conclusion 
The frequency of tax amnesties increased substantially in the early 2000s with several 
states offering repeated amnesties. In this paper, we examine if the revenue yield motive or the 
fiscal stress motive primarily drives states to enact amnesties. We apply several methods of event 
history analyses to investigate the validity of various assumptions regarding the distribution of 
hazards that could possibly play a role in tax amnesty enactments. Using a Cox regression model, 
which does not require any assumption about the distribution of hazards, we find a negative 
relation between a state’s fiscal health and amnesty enactment. Our results suggest that fiscal 
pressures, especially declines in per capita income and per capita total tax revenue, and increases 
in the unemployment rate, play an important role in the amnesty adoption decision. These results 
are robust to a separate analysis of the initial amnesties and the repeated amnesties that states 
enacted between 1982 and 2005. 
Our findings contrast with past research that investigated amnesties in the 1980s and 
found no evidence that states enacted tax amnesties due to fiscal pressure (Dubin, Graetz and 
Wilde, 1992). We find that the fiscal stress motive, not the revenue yield motive, was the major 
factor  explaining  the  increased  frequency  of  amnesty  enactment  during  and  after  the  2001 
recession. Even the initial amnesties in the 1980s do not support the revenue yield motive once 
we relax the assumption of normal distribution of hazards and control for multicollinearity in the 
fiscal health variables. A recent Wall Street Journal article by Arden Dale noted that 12 states 
had tax amnesty programs in 2009 and 10 to 15 more are expected in 2010. It is noteworthy that   22 
these recent amnesties follow closely the financial crisis and the economic recession that started 
in 2008. They are indeed consistent with the fiscal stress hypothesis and our empirical results.
14 
An  important  role  temporal  aggregation  plays  in  our  research  implies  that  state 
legislatures at the policy formulation level may be less concerned with day to day, or monthly or 
even quarterly fluctuations in tax revenue collections. It may well be that when annual total tax 
revenue  collections  decline  due  to  persistent  decline  in  income  or  steady  increase  in 
unemployment, states enact amnesties. At the same time, it is ironic that these tax amnesties can 
also be interpreted in light of a time inconsistency problem. While each amnesty is announced to 
be unique, the unprecedented numbers of tax amnesties send a wrong signal to tax-payers. In 
fact, these repeated amnesties have unintended, long-run consequences that their architects didn’t 
anticipate (Luitel, and Sobel, 2007, Luitel, 2007). 
We  have  identified  several  areas  that  need  further  investigation,  which  we  leave  for 
future research. First, since our objective in present paper was to examine why states enact or 
repeat an amnesty in the first place, we did not model specific tax amnesty characteristics. As 
noted in Section 2, there are several differences amongst state amnesties in terms of whether 
accounts receivable are included, whether installment arrangements are permitted, and whether 
interest and penalties are waived. One way to explore these differences in the features of amnesty 
is to model them as sequential events. For example, states first decide to offer an amnesty; then, 
independent of that decision, they decide whether to include accounts receivable, whether to 
permit installment arrangements, and whether to waive interest and penalties etc. For this, a 
multinomial logit analysis would be appropriate. Second, in this paper, we modeled state tax 
amnesty  programs  as  a  single  type  of  event.  Again,  as  indicated  in  Section  2,  voluntary 
                                                 
14 The article entitled “More States Jump on Tax-Amnesty Bandwagon,” appeared on the online version of the Wall 
Street Journal on November 19, 2009. It can be accessed at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704204304574544051138231422.html    23 
disclosure agreements (VDAs) can be seen as an alternative to a more general state tax amnesty 
program. As VDAs gain momentum in the future, a comparative analysis of these arrangements 
to  the  enactment  of  tax  amnesty  programs  becomes  desirable.  Finally,  the  choice  between 
increasing tax rates and enacting an amnesty needs further analysis. In addition to VDAs, state 
tax rate increases and tax amnesty programs can be seen as competing risks or multiple events, 
and the choice among them should be modeled as such. 
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Figure 1: New Amnesty vs. Repeated Amnesties (as of December 2005) 
 
Source:  Federation of Tax Administrators, http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/amnesty1.html. 
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Table 1: Tax Amnesties Offered by the States (as of December 2005) 
 






None  9  Alaska
a,c,  Delaware








One  13  Alabama,  Georgia,  Idaho,  Indiana,  Iowa, 
Minnesota,  Nebraska,  Nevada
a,b,  North 
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota
a,b, 
Vermont 
Two  20  Arkansas,  California,  Colorado,  Illinois, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, 
Mississippi,  New  Hampshire
a,c,  New  Mexico, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina,  Texas
a,b,  Virginia,  West  Virginia, 
Wisconsin 
Three  6  Arizona, Connecticut
d, Florida
a, Massachusetts, 
Missouri, New Jersey 
Four  2  Louisiana, New York 
Notes:  a:   no personal income tax 
  b:   no corporate income tax 
  c:   no general sales tax 
  d:   Connecticut introduced personal income tax only in 1991. 
 
Source: Federation of Tax Administrators, http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/amnesty1.html. 
Web access date: 01/27/2010. 
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Table 2 - Characteristics of State Tax Amnesties (1982 – 2005) 









Number of Amnesties that 
Permitted Installment 
Arrangements  
Yes  66  42  28 
No  7  25  31 
No information
b  6  13  20 
Source: FTA, July 2007. http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/amnesty1.html. Web access date: 01/27/2010. 
Notes: 
a The 1984-85 California amnesty allowed known delinquents of individual income taxes to participate in 
the amnesty but it didn’t allow known delinquents of sales taxes to participate in the amnesty. Therefore, it 
is counted twice in this category. 
b Information on amnesty characteristics was not available from the FTA. 
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Total tax   
Name of State  Begin  End  (000)  Rank  Revenue  Rank 
ALABAMA  1/20/1984  4/1/1984  $5,354  59  0.12%  58 
ARIZONA 
  First amnesty  11/22/1982  1/20/1983  $10,416  52  0.29%  44 
  Second amnesty  1/1/2002  2/28/2002  N/A  N/A 
  Third amnesty  9/1/2003  10/31/2003  $77,577  22  0.84%  26 
ARKANSAS 
  First amnesty  9/1/1987  11/30/1987  $2,625  60  0.09%  59 
  Second amnesty  7/1/2004  12/31/2004  N/A  N/A 
CALIFORNIA 
  First amnesty  12/10/1984  3/15/1985  $319,932  6  0.68%  31 
  Second amnesty  2/1/2005  3/31/2005  N/A  N/A 
COLORADO 
  First amnesty  9/16/1985  11/15/1985  $10,394  53  0.28%  45 
  Second amnesty   6/1/2003  6/30/2003   $19,554  45  0.28%  47 
CONNECTICUT 
  First amnesty  9/1/1990  11/30/1990  $74,792  23  1.03%  22 
  Second amnesty  9/1/1995  11/30/1995  $56,662  27  0.62%  34 
  Third amnesty  9/1/2002  12/2/2002  $118,328  16  1.21%  18 
FLORIDA 
  First amnesty  1/1/1987  6/30/1987  $20,073  44  0.13%  57 
  Second amnesty  1/1/1988  6/30/1988  $12,540  48  0.07%  60 
  Third amnesty  7/1/2003  10/31/2003  $85,016  20  0.30%  43 
GEORGIA  10/1/1992  12/5/1992  $67,031  25  0.71%  30 
IDAHO  5/20/1983  8/30/1983  $521  70  0.05%  65 
ILLINOIS 
  First amnesty  10/1/1984  11/30/1984  $268,545  10  1.84%  8 
  Second amnesty   10/1/2003  11/17/2003   $565,356  3  2.40%  4 
INDIANA  9/15/2005  11/15/2005  $255,000  11  1.98%  5 
IOWA  9/2/1986  10/31/1986  $55,769  28  1.43%  12 
KANSAS 
  First amnesty  7/1/1984  9/30/1984  $1,004  67  0.03%  68 
  Second amnesty  10/1/2003  11/30/2003  $57,067  26  1.07%  21 
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Total tax   
Name of State  Begin  End  (000)  Rank  Revenue  Rank 
KENTUCKY 
  First amnesty  9/15/1988  9/30/1988  $149,280  14  2.73%  1 
  Second amnesty  8/1/2002  9/30/2002  $108,557  17  1.25%  17 
LOUISIANA 
  First amnesty  10/1/1985  12/31/1985  $1,949  61  0.03%  69 
  Second amnesty  10/1/1987  12/15/1987  $463  71  0.01%  71 
  Third amnesty  10/1/1998  12/31/1998  $1,520  64  0.02%  70 
  Fourth amnesty  9/1/2001  10/30/2001  $212,797  12  2.68%  2 
MAINE 
  First amnesty  11/1/1990  12/31/1990  $40,166  36  1.86%  7 
  Second amnesty  9/1/2003  11/30/2003  $39,957  37  1.39%  13 
MARYLAND 
  First amnesty  9/1/1987  11/2/1987  $53,425  30  0.66%  32 
  Second amnesty  9/1/2001  10/31/2001  $43,243  35  0.36%  42 
MASSACHUSETTS 
  First amnesty  10/17/1983  1/17/1984  $144,730  15  1.48%  11 
  Second amnesty  10/1/2002  11/30/2002  $104,324  19  0.65%  33 
  Third amnesty  1/1/2003  2/28/2003  $11,902  49  0.07%  61 
MICHIGAN 
  First amnesty  5/12/1986  6/30/1986  $174,457  13  1.18%  19 
  Second amnesty  5/15/2002  6/30/2002  N/A  N/A 
MINNESOTA  8/1/1984  10/31/1984  $20,245  43  0.24%  51 
MISSISSIPPI 
  First amnesty  9/1/1986  11/30/1986  $1,589  62  0.05%  64 
  Second amnesty   9/1/2004  12/31/2004   $8,164  55  0.15%  55 
MISSOURI 
  First amnesty  9/1/1983  10/31/1983  $1,562  63  0.03%  67 
  Second amnesty  8/1/2002  10/31/2002  $82,938  21  0.88%  24 
  Third amnesty  8/1/2003  10/31/2003  $21,254  42  0.23%  52 
NEBRASKA  8/1/2004  10/31/2004  $7,750  57  0.21%  53 
NEVADA  2/1/2002  6/30/2002  $7,925  56  0.19%  54 
NEW HAMPSHIRE 
  First amnesty  12/1/1997  2/17/1998  $15,787  46  1.34%  15 
  Second amnesty  12/1/2001  2/15/2002  $14,655  47  0.71%  29 
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Total tax   
Name of State  Begin  End  (000)  Rank  Revenue  Rank 
NEW JERSEY 
  First amnesty  9/10/1987  12/8/1987  $287,968  9  1.97%  6 
  Second amnesty  3/15/1996  6/1/1996  $432,069  4  2.50%  3 
  Third amnesty  4/15/2002  6/10/2002  $300,595  7  1.51%  10 
NEW MEXICO 
  First amnesty  8/15/1985  11/13/1985  $22,087  41  0.95%  23 
  Second amnesty  8/16/1999  11/12/1999  $51,862  32  1.30%  16 
NEW YORK 
  First amnesty  11/1/1985  1/31/1986  $637,612  1  1.76%  9 
  Second amnesty  11/1/1996  1/31/1997  $299,683  8  0.73%  28 
  Third amnesty  11/18/2002  1/31/2003  $619,235  2  1.38%  14 
  Fourth amnesty  10/1/2005  3/1/2006  $337,990  5  0.61%  35 
NORTH CAROLINA  9/1/1989  12/1/1989  $54,087  29  0.51%  39 
NORTH DAKOTA 
  First amnesty  9/1/1983  11/30/1983  $347  72  0.04%  66 
  Second amnesty  10/1/2003  1/31/2004  $7,130  58  0.56%  36 
OHIO  10/15/2001  1/15/2002  $52,650  31  0.24%  50 
OKLAHOMA 
  First amnesty  7/1/1984  12/31/1984  $23,257  40  0.52%  38 
  Second amnesty  8/15/2002  11/15/2002  N/A  N/A 
PENNSYLVANIA  10/13/1995  1/10/1996  N/A  N/A 
RHODE ISLAND 
  First amnesty  10/15/1986  1/12/1987  $1,081  66  0.07%  62 
  Second amnesty  4/15/1996  6/28/1996  $9,508  54  0.51%  40 
SOUTH CAROLINA 
  First amnesty  9/1/1985  11/30/1985  $11,531  50  0.26%  49 
  Second amnesty  10/15/2002  12/2/2002  $71,865  24  1.09%  20 
SOUTH DAKOTA  4/1/1999  5/15/1999  $576  69  0.06%  63 
TEXAS 
  First amnesty  2/1/1984  2/29/1984  $837  68  0.01%  72 
  Second amnesty  3/11/2004  3/31/2004  N/A  N/A 
VERMONT  5/15/1990  6/25/1990  $1,385  65  0.15%  56 
VIRGINIA 
  First amnesty  2/1/1990  3/31/1990  $44,598  33  0.49%  41 
  Second amnesty  9/2/2003  11/3/2003  $104,463  18  0.76%  27 
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Total tax   
Name of State  Begin  End  (000)  Rank  Revenue  Rank 
WEST VIRGINIA 
  First amnesty  10/1/1986  12/31/1986  $25,263  39  0.86%  25 
  Second amnesty  9/1/2004  10/31/2004  $10,747  51  0.28%  46 
WISCONSIN 
  First amnesty  9/15/1985  11/22/1985  $44,336  34  0.54%  37 
  Second amnesty  6/15/1998  8/14/1998  $36,136  38  0.28%  48 
AVERAGE  $93,714  0.75% 
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Table 4 – Variable Description (Source) and Summary Statistics 
Variable  No of  
Observation  Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Minimum  Maximum  Name  Description (source) 
Initial amnesty  Initial amnesty equals 1 during the year of amnesty, 0 before (1)  517  .079  .270  0  1 
Repeated 
amnesty 
Repeated amnesty equals 1 during the year of amnesty, 0 before 





Log of per capita personal income (2)  1200  10.073  .206  9.482  10.646 
Per capita total 
tax revenue  Log of per capita total tax revenue (3)  1200  7.043  .558  5.375  8.309 
Unemployment 
rate  Log of unemployment rate (4)  1200  -2.904  .333  -3.772  -1.748 
Population 65 
years and over   Log of population 65 years and over (5)  1200  12.873  1.062  9.497  15.168 
Democrat  Equal to 1 if Democrats control the state and 0 otherwise (6)  1200  .242  .428  0  1 
Republican  Equal to 1 if Republicans control the state and 0 otherwise (6)  1200  .170  .375  0  1 
Election  Equal to 1 if gubernatorial election is held and 0 otherwise (6)  1200  .261  .439  0  1 
Average of the 
personal 
income tax rate 
Log of average of the personal income tax rate (7)  975  -2.980  .459  -4.199  -1.272 
Average of the 
corporate 
income tax rate 
Log of average of the corporate income tax rate (7)  1080  -2.725  .301  -4.017  -2.067 
Average of the 
sales tax rate  Log of average of the sales tax rate (7)  1080  -3.031  .225  -3.912  -2.525 
 
1.  Federation of Tax Administrators, http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/amnesty1.html 
2.  U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, State and Local Area Personal Income, Washington, D. C. 
3.  U.S. Census Bureau, State Government Finances, Washington, D.C. 
4.  U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Demographics, Washington, D.C. 
5.  U.S. Census Bureau, Population Estimates, Washington, D.C. 
6.  National Governors Association; Official Election Websites at state level. 
7.  Commerce Clearing House, Inc., State Tax Handbook, 1980 – 2003. 
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Log of per capita personal 
income   1                   
Log of per capita total tax 
revenue  0.777  1                 
Log of unemployment rate  -0.545  -0.508  1               
Log of population 65 years 
and over  0.376  0.103  0.153  1             
Democrat  -0.233  -0.103  0.217  -0.085  1           
Republican  0.078  0.029  -0.152  -0.053  -0.254  1         
Election   -0.055  -0.055  0.041  -0.035  0.032  -0.012  1       
Log of average of the 
personal income tax rate  -0.007  0.149  -0.143  -0.489  -0.065  -0.033  0.061  1     
Log of average of the 
corporate income tax rate  0.315  0.299  -0.146  0.144  -0.098  -0.049  -0.0009  0.181  1   
Log of average of the sales 
tax rate  0.272  0.437  -0.057  0.078  -0.107  0.078  -0.044  0.051  0.310  1 
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Table 6 –Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results for Fiscal Health Indicators 
(Using our variable definitions predicting DGW Results during 1980 to 1988 period) 
 
Variables  Model (1)
a  Model (2)
b 


















LR  2 χ value  2 χ (3) =  10.72  2 χ (3) = 5.02 
Probability  0.013  0.170 
Log likelihood  -58.023  -48.964 
No of observations  360  450 
Notes: Figures in parenthesis are absolute z-statistics, *indicates 5 percent significance level. 
a.  Model (1) excludes Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Texas, Washington and Wyoming. 
b.  Model (2) includes all 50 states.   38 
Table 7A –Cox Model Regression Results for Initial Amnesties (1982 – 2005) 





a  Model (2)
 b 
β  Exp(β)  z-statistics  β  Exp(β)  z-statistics 
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3) 
Log of per capita personal 
income 
-6.649  0.0012  -5.55**  -7.144  .0007  -4.64** 
Log of population 65 
years and over 
0.640  1.897  3.28**  0.812  2.253  2.53* 
Election  -0.233  0.791  -0.59  -0.539  0.583  -1.17 
Democrat  -0.038  0.962  -0.10  0.197  1.217  0.42 
Republican  -1.034  0.355  -1.84  -1.240  0.289  -1.77 
Log of average of the 
personal income tax rate 
-  -  -  1.131  3.100  2.24* 
Log of average of the 
corporate income tax rate 
-  -  -  0.767  2.153  0.83 
Log of average of the 
sales tax rate 
-  -  -  -1.413  0.243  -1.70 
LR  2 χ value  2 χ (5) = 56.56  2 χ (8) = 44.63 
Probability  0.000  0.000 
Log likelihood  -197.743  -144.215 
No of observations  517  276 
Notes: **indicates 1 percent significance level, *indicates 5 percent significance level. 
a.  Model 1 includes all 50 states. 
b.  Model 2 excludes states without personal income tax, corporate income tax, general sales tax, and 
Connecticut. 
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Table 7B –Cox Model Regression Results for Initial Amnesties (1982 – 2005) 





a  Model (2)
 b 
β  Exp(β)  z-statistics  β  Exp(β)  z-statistics 
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3) 
Log of per capita total tax 
revenue 
-2.891  0.055  -4.17**  -3.747  0.0235  -3.50** 
Log of population 65 
years and over 
0.358  1.431  1.89  0.459  1.583  1.46 
Election  -0.278  0.756  -0.70  -0.599  0.5491  -1.30 
Democrat  0.415  1.515  1.18  0.533  1.704  1.19 
Republican  -1.241  0.288  -2.09*  -1.315  0.2683  -1.83 
Log of average of the 
personal income tax rate 
-  -  -  1.004  2.729  2.21* 
Log of average of the 
corporate income tax rate 
-  -  -  0.075  1.078  0.08 
Log of average of the 
sales tax rate 
-  -  -  -0.627  0.5339  -0.69 
LR  2 χ value  2 χ (5) = 39.93  2 χ (8) = 35.56 
Probability  0.000  0.000 
Log likelihood  -206.062  -148.748 
No of observations  517  276 
Notes: **indicates 1 percent significance level, *indicates 5 percent significance level. 
a.  Model 1 includes all 50 states. 
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Table 7C –Cox Model Regression Results for Initial Amnesties (1982 – 2005) 





a  Model (2)
 b 
β  Exp(β)  z-statistics  β  Exp(β)  z-statistics 
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3) 
Log of unemployment 
rate 
2.148  8.567  3.75**  3.642  38.169  5.98** 
Log of population 65 
years and over 
0.440  1.552  2.73**  0.1284  1.137  0.45 
Election  -0.223  0.799  -0.56  -0.4531  0.6356  -0.98 
Democrat  0.464  1.591  1.35  -0.2728  0.7612  -0.61 
Republican  -0.446  0.639  -0.80  -0.8748  0.4169  -1.23 
Log of average of the 
personal income tax rate 
-  -  -  0.7167  2.047  1.41 
Log of average of the 
corporate income tax rate 
-  -  -  0.9391  2.557  1.34 
Log of average of the 
sales tax rate 
-  -  -  -3.285  0.0374  -3.21** 
LR  2 χ value  2 χ (5) = 35.56  2 χ (8) = 54.54 
Probability  0.000  0.000 
Log likelihood  -208.243  -139.258 
No of observations  517  276 
Notes: **indicates 1 percent significance level, *indicates 5 percent significance level. 
a.  Model 1 includes all 50 states. 
b.  Model 2 excludes states without personal income tax, corporate income tax, general sales tax, and 
Connecticut. 
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Table 8A –Cox Model Regression Results for Repeated Amnesties (1982 – 2005) 





a  Model (2)
 b 
β  Exp(β)  z-statistics  β  Exp(β)  z-statistics 
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3) 
Log of per capita personal 
income 
-4.189  0.0151  -5.40**  -6.476  .0015  -6.19** 
Log of population 65 
years and over 
0.4687  1.597  3.62**  0.839  2.314  4.48** 
Election  0.2195  1.245  0.90  0.0504  1.051  0.18 
Democrat  -0.2835  0.7530  -1.03  -0.3116  .7322  -1.05 
Republican  -0.5132  0.5985  -1.66  -0.1563  .8552  -0.44 
Log of average of the 
personal income tax rate 
-  -  -  1.062  2.892  3.18** 
Log of average of the 
corporate income tax rate 
-  -  -  .7862  2.195  1.60 
Log of average of the 
sales tax rate 
-  -  -  -1.932  .1448  -3.21** 
LR  2 χ value  2 χ (5) = 41.91  2 χ (8) = 61.35 
Probability  0.000  0.000 
Log likelihood  -523.241  -407.990 
No of observations  1200  888 
Notes: **indicates 1 percent significance level, *indicates 5 percent significance level. 
a.  Model 1 includes all 50 states. 
b.  Model 2 excludes states without personal income tax, corporate income tax, general sales tax, and 
Connecticut. 
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Table 8B –Cox Model Regression Results for Repeated Amnesties (1982 – 2005) 





a  Model (2)
 b 
β  Exp(β)  z-statistics  β  Exp(β)  z-statistics 
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3) 
Log of per capita total tax 
revenue 
-3.153  .0427  -6.18**  -5.159  .0057  -6.05** 
Log of population 65 
years and over 
0.2560  1.291  2.16*  .5614  1.753  2.94** 
Election  0.1859  1.204  0.76  .0461  1.047  0.17 
Democrat  -0.0164  .9836  -0.06  .1146  1.121  0.40 
Republican  -0.9149  .4005  -2.87**  -.3862  .6796  -1.09 
Log of average of the 
personal income tax rate 
-  -  -  1.030  2.801  3.48** 
Log of average of the 
corporate income tax rate 
-  -  -  .7978  2.220  1.44 
Log of average of the 
sales tax rate 
-  -  -  -.3577  .6992  -0.57 
LR  2 χ value  2 χ (5) = 49.00  2 χ (8) = 57.75 
Probability  0.000  0.000 
Log likelihood  -519.694  -409.788 
No of observations  1200  888 
Notes: **indicates 1 percent significance level, *indicates 5 percent significance level. 
a.  Model 1 includes all 50 states. 
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Table 8C –Cox Model Regression Results for Repeated Amnesties (1982 – 2005) 





a  Model (2)
 b 
β  Exp(β)  z-statistics  β  Exp(β)  z-statistics 
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3) 
Log of unemployment 
rate 
2.089  8.079  4.68**  3.350  28.525  6.79** 
Log of population 65 
years and over 
0.1433  1.154  1.38  -0.0344  .9661  -0.23 
Election  0.2350  1.264  0.96  0.1068  1.112  0.39 
Democrat  -0.0962  0.9082  -0.36  -0.3563  .7002  -1.19 
Republican  -0.3837  0.6812  -1.24  -0.3276  .7206  -0.91 
Log of average of the 
personal income tax rate 
-  -  -  0.3857  1.470  1.24 
Log of average of the 
corporate income tax rate 
-  -  -  0.8111  2.250  1.79 
Log of average of the 
sales tax rate 
-  -  -  -2.419  .0889  -4.25** 
LR  2 χ value  2 χ (5) = 31.27  2 χ (8) = 60.77 
Probability  0.000  0.000 
Log likelihood  -528.563  -408.279 
No of observations  1200  888 
Notes: **indicates 1 percent significance level, *indicates 5 percent significance level. 
a.  Model 1 includes all 50 states. 
b.  Model 2 excludes states without personal income tax, corporate income tax, general sales tax, and 
Connecticut. 
 
 
 